Remark!: A Secure Protocol for Remote Exams by Giustolisi, Rosario et al.
Remark! : A Secure Protocol for Remote Exams
Rosario Giustolisi, Gabriele Lenzini, and Peter Y.A. Ryan
SnT - University of Luxembourg
Abstract. This paper is about secure remote examination. It presents
Remark! , an electronic exam protocol which achieves several authentica-
tion, (conditional) anonymity, privacy, and verifiability properties with-
out trusted third parties. Remark! is primarily designed for invigilated
Internet-based exams but it also fits computer-based exams with candi-
dates taking their exam in classrooms.
1 Introduction
There is a growing requirement to evaluate skills of people remotely and hence
increase in interest in how to design secure remote electronic exams (in short,
e-exams).
Traditional exams consist at least of four phases: registration, testing, mark-
ing, and notification. During the registration phase, a new exam is arranged,
usually by a manager, and candidates enrol for it. During the testing phase, the
candidates receive and take a test and submit their answers. During the mark-
ing phase, examiners assess the answers and assign a mark. Finally, during the
notification phase, candidates learn their marks.
E-exams are organized similarly, and with the same principals involved in
running the e-exam: candidates, one or more examiners, and a manager. The
role of a candidate and that of an examiner are obvious. The role of the man-
ager is to register eligible candidates and examiners for an examination, to assign
the test questions to the candidates and, once they have submitted their answers,
to distribute the answered test to examiners and gather the marks. Finally, the
manager notifies the candidates with marks. Depending on the specific imple-
mentation, the manager’s duties can be further split among other principals,
such as question committee, invigilator, collector, and notifier.
To our knowledge only few works propose exam protocols with security in
mind. Castella-Roca et al. [5] propose an e-exam system with a fully trusted
manager. Huszti & Petho [2] propose an e-exam scheme with fewer trust re-
quirements on principals.
Contribution. This paper first identifies threats and requirements for e-exams,
and proposes Remark! , an e-exam protocol primarily designed for invigilated
internet-based exams. Besides the protocol also suits computer-based testing
where candidates take the exam at examination venue, such as a classroom or a
test centre. Our protocol achieves authentication, verifiability, and (conditional)
anonymity without relying on trusted parties.
2 Threat Model, Security Requirements, and
Assumptions.
Threats. E-exams are subject to threats from outsiders as well as from insiders,
since each role has different capabilities and incentives to misbehave. Remark!
is designed to withstand the following threats:
1. An intruder impersonating a candidate during the testing.
2. An intruder tampering with a candidate’s test answer and mark.
3. A candidate trying to get an higher mark than that deserved (overmarked).
4. A candidate trying to discover who is the examiner evaluating her test.
5. The manager tampering with the marks.
6. The examiner trying to assign a biased mark to a submitted test.
7. An examiner colluding with a candidate to overmark her test answer.
Security Requirements. We have identified several fundamental security require-
ments that a secure e-exam should fulfil. The list outlined above takes inspiration
and extends the requirements described in [3] :
p1: Test Answer Authentication: the manager only accepts test answers
submitted by the registered candidates. This means that the candidate, the
test assigned to her, and their association should be authenticated and pre-
served, for instance against collusion among candidates.
p2: Examiner Authentication: the manager only accepts evaluations made
by a registered examiner. This rather obvious requirement means that the
mark assigned to a test answer is authentic.
p3: Anonymous Marking : no one learns the author of a test answer before
it has been marked. This requirement states that only the candidate who
wrote the answers knows the association between her identity and the test.
Notably, this should resist to collusion between examiner and manager.
p4: Anonymous Examiner : no candidate learns the identity of the examiner
who evaluates their test answers. This requirement ensures that no candidate
can coerce an examiner before and after he evaluates her test answer.
p5: Question Secrecy : no candidate learns the test questions before the test-
ing phase begins. This ensures a desirable grade of fairness among candidates
as no one knows the questions in advance, provided that no one is illegiti-
mately allowed to know the answers beforehand.
p6: Question Privacy : the manager does not learn which test question is as-
signed to a specific candidate. This requirement ensures that the manager
cannot identify a candidate by looking at its questions once it has been
submitted for evaluation.
p7: Mark Privacy : the candidate learns only her mark and not those of other
candidates. This is a rather standard requirement, despite not everywhere
applied, meaning that the mark of a test is known only by the author of test,
and possibly by the manager, who may need it for registering the mark.
p8: Test Verifiability : the candidate can verify that her test is considered for
evaluation. This requirement states that the candidate has a way to check
whether her submitted test has been accepted by the manager.
p9: Mark Verifiability : the candidate can verify that the manager registers
the mark assigned to her by the examiner. This ensures that the candidate
notices if the mark assigned to her test is different from the one registered
by the manager.
Assumptions. Our design and our analysis rely on the following assumptions:
1. Each principal is given a public/private pair of keys.
2. The candidate holds a smart card, carrying the candidate’s identity visibly
engraved, that stores her private key security (i.e., it cannot be extracted).
3. To mitigate plagiarism, candidates are invigilated during the testing. This
can be done remotely by using software such as ProctorU [1]).
4. The model answers are kept secret from the candidates until after the exam
has completed. Note: the examiners may be provided with the model answers.
5. An authenticated, append-only, bulletin board is available. On it, everyone
is guaranteed to see the same data. Write access will be restricted however
to the appropriate entities. (e.g., see [4]).
6. Secure and private channels, such as SSL, are available.
3 The Protocol
Remark! relies on several servers that implement an exponentiation mixnet [6].
The peculiarity of this kind of mixnet is that each mix server blinds its entries
by a common exponent value in contrast to a conventional re-encryption mixnet.
Here, it is assumed that at least one server among the ones in a mixnet behaves
honestly. Thus, if the mixnet is made of m servers and ri is the exponent value
of ith server, then the mixnet, once given the input X, outputs Xrm , where
rm =
∏m
i=1 ri.
Remark! makes use of exponentiation mixnet at registration, to create the
pseudonyms for the candidates and examiners. The mixnet is required also at
notification, to revoke the candidates pseudonyms and retrieve the candidates’
identities. (The generation of pseudonyms for candidates is separated from that
for examiners because, at notification, only the identities of candidates should
be revealed.)
A bulletin board (bulletin board) is used to publish the pseudonyms, the ques-
tions, the tests and the marks. The bulletin board is also used by the mixnet’s
servers to publish their intermediate shuﬄing (see later). In so doing anyone can
check the authenticity of each mix step.
The following paragraphs detail how to use exponentiation mixnets to gen-
erate pseudonyms, and describe all the phases of Remark! . The protocol’s steps
are also illustrated synthetically in Appendix in form of a message sequence
chart. In the reminder, 〈Xi〉 is a shorthand for the list 〈X1, . . . Xn〉, and rk is a
shorthand for
∏k
i=1 ri (so, r1 = r1, and r2 = r1r2, etc.) and pik for pik ◦ · · · ◦ pi1,
(so, pi1 = pi1, and pi2 = pi2 ◦ pi1, etc.).
Registration
The registration uses a exponentiation mixnet to generate pseudonyms for the
candidates and examiners, in two different runs. Without loss of generalization
the pseudonyms for the candidates are assumed to be generated first.
In particular, let us assume n eligible candidates of identities C1, . . . , Cn. Let
g denote a generator of a multiplicative subgroup G of order q. Each Ci has a
public/pair keys (PK i,SK i), each PK i = g
SK i . The identities of the candidates
as well as their public keys are public.
The first mix server mix 1 takes 〈PK i〉 —the list of the public keys of the
candidates— generates a fresh random r1 ∈ {1, q − 1}, and computes 〈PK r1i 〉
—the list of the public keys to the r1. Then mix 1 signs and sends this list in
secret shuﬄed order (i.e., it sends 〈PK r1pi1(i)〉, where pi1 is the permutation of
indexes applied by mix 1), along with g
r1 to the next mix server. Further mix
servers repeat these steps as required. Each mix server signs and publishes the
shuﬄed list on the bulletin board, as shown in Figure 1. The last mixserver,
mixm, publishes also g
rm . Note that if the bulletin board has an access control
mechanism, (i.e., if only mix servers can publish data therein) the signatures are
no longer required.
mix1 mix2 mixm
C1 PK 1 PK
r1
pi1(1)
PK r2pi2(1) · · · PK
rm
pim(1)
= PK 1
C2 PK 1 PK
r1
pi1(2)
PK r2pi2(2) · · · PK
rm
pim(2)
= PK 2
...
...
...
...
...
Cn PKn PK
r1
pi1(n)
PK r2pi2(n) · · · PK
r
pim(n)
= PKn
g gr1 gr2 · · · grm = hC
Fig. 1. Using exponentiation mixnet to generate pseudonyms. All the terms within the
box are published on the bulletin board.
While the intermediate steps should be posted to a bulletin board, there is
no need for the intermediate gr1 , . . . , grm−1 terms be posted. This is to avoid
each candidate tracking their intermediate pseudonyms through the mixnet: al-
though such eventuality is not an attack, it is an undesired feature. The last
mix server mixm publishes the final hC = g
rm , and the list of pseudonyms
〈PK i〉 = 〈PK rmpim(i)〉. A zero-knowledge proof could be required to prove that the
mix servers behave correctly. Once the shuﬄed pseudonyms and the correspond-
ing signatures have been posted along with hC , each candidate, say Ck, can
recognize her pseudonym among those in the shuﬄed list 〈PK i〉 by computing
hSKkC and finding the match. The pseudonym from now on serves as the pseudo
identity for Ck.
After the pseudonyms of candidates have been published, the mixnet gener-
ates the pseudonyms for examiners in a similar way. Since a different random
value is used by the mix servers to generate the examiner pseudonyms, a different
hE is published at the end of the mix.
Testing
Before starting the testing phase, the manager generates the test questions,
signs them with its private key SKM , and encrypts each test question under a
candidate pseudonym. A test question is a list of questions. Depending on the
examination, different tests can be made of distinct or permuted questions.
As soon as the testing starts, the manager authenticates the candidate via
remote invigilation software. In particular, the manager checks whether the can-
didate details printed on the top of the smart card matches the candidate iden-
tity. When all candidates have been authenticated, the manager publishes the
encrypted test questions in the bulletin board. Once all the candidates have
received their test questions, they are allowed to work on their test answers.
When the candidate concludes the test answer, she can submit the test as
follows: the candidate appends her pseudonym and the test answer to the test
question, so the filled test is TC = 〈ques, ans,PK 〉. Then, she signs TC with her
private key SKC using the generator hC instead of g. Thus, the signature can
be verified using the candidate’s pseudonym PKC . The candidate then encrypts
the signed test with the public key of the manager PKM , and submits it to the
manager. The manager collects and decrypts the test, which is signed using the
manager private key SKM . The manager then encrypts the signed test under the
corresponding candidate’s pseudonym, and publishes the encryption as receipt.
Marking
The manager encrypts the signed test under an eligible examiner pseudonym
PKE , which is on the bulletin board. The corresponding examiner assigns a
mark to the test, which is appended to the signed test, thus generating the
evaluation MC = 〈Sig{TC}SKM ,mark〉. The examiner then signs MC with his
private key SKE and the generator hE . The examiner finally encrypts MC under
PKM and submits his evaluation to the manager.
Notification
The manager receives the encrypted evaluation from the examiner, which are de-
crypted and re-encrypted under the corresponding candidate pseudonym PKC .
The manager publishes all the test evaluations together. Then, the manager
asks the mixnet to reveal the random values r used to generate the candidates
pseudonyms. In so doing, the candidate anonymity is revoked, and the mark can
finally be registered.
Notification (alternative) Some universities allow candidates decide whether to
get the mark or to withdraw their test entirely without any mark being notified
and registered. This particular way to run a final exam is adopted, for instance,
by those universities where candidates are conceded with a limited amount of
failures during the exam season, mainly to discourage them from taking the exam
without adequate preparation. Other universities, again to discourage candidates
to sit at the exam just ‘to try it out’, have a rule saying that if a candidate chooses
to know her mark and this turns out to be a fail, then she has to skip the next
exam session. By giving a candidate the possibility to withdraw a test without
knowing the mark, those universities soften the severity of such rules, by letting
a candidate spare wasting one of her attempt token when she realizes, by her
own, to have performed insufficiently.
Remark! can include such requirement via an alternative notification phase.
In this case, the manager publishes a public commit of the mark, instead of the
mark. Then, if a candidate wants to know her mark, she proves the knowledge of
her private key. If so, the manager reveals the commitment parameter, and the
candidate can check the commitment. Notably, the notification does not involve
the mixnet.
4 Security Analysis
We discuss informally the security of Remark! and give arguments supporting
the claim that it achieves our security requirements. We organize our argumen-
tation in four sections. The first section discusses authenticity properties, the
second anonymity properties, the third privacy properties, and the last verifia-
bility properties.
Authentication Test Answer Authentication (p1) is achieved because the man-
ager only accepts the test whose signature can be only verified with a pseudonym
published by the mixnet. No one but the candidate who holds the corresponding
private key can generate a correct signature. Colluding candidates who switch
their smart cards are detected by invigilation.
Examiner Authentication (p2) holds because the manager encrypts the test
with the examiner’s pseudonym. Only the examiner who holds the corresponding
private key obtains the test, and the manager accepts the evaluation only if it
can check the signature using the corresponding examiner’s pseudonym.
Anonymity The pseudonym guarantees the anonymity of the test submitted
by the candidate, who signs the test with her private key and the generator
hC . The mix servers cannot associate a pseudonym to a candidate’s identity,
unless all of them collude. Even if a malicious examiner colludes with the man-
ager, Anonymous Marking (p3) holds until all the mix servers reveal their secret
exponents.
Remark! ensures Anonymous Examiner (p4) because the manager encrypts
the test with the examiner’s pseudonym. The examiner can fairly evaluate the
anonymous test answers without fear of being coerced by any candidate as exam-
iners’ pseudonyms are not revoked by the mixnet. Moreover, if the examination
board consists of different examiners, a candidate has no guarantee that a col-
luding examiner will evaluate her test answers.
Privacy Question Secrecy (p5) is achieved because the manager publishes the
test question once the candidate is under invigilation.
The manager cannot learn which test question is assigned to a specific can-
didate because the test question are encrypted with the anonymous candidate’s
pseudonym. Thus, Remark! ensures Question Privacy (p6).
The protocol also ensures Mark Privacy (p7) because the mark is encrypted
with the candidate’s pseudonym and then published on the bulletin board. Thus,
each candidate only learns her corresponding mark. Notably, only the manager
learns the mark after the mixnet reveal the secret exponents.
Verifiability Each mix server publishes its generated list of pseudonyms (the
intermediated and the last), which are signed and with a zero-knowledge proof of
correctness (e.g., that all pseudonyms are generated by using the same exponen-
tial value). This allow any observer to verify the authenticity and the correctness
of the pseudonyms. Once the final pseudonyms are published on the bulletin
board, each eligible candidate and examiner can only find their corresponding
pseudonym.
Test Verifiability (p8) is guaranteed because the manager publishes the re-
ceipt after it receives a valid signature (i.e. the manager can verify a signature
using a pseudonym as verification key). Thus the candidate can verify that her
test is considered for evaluation. Moreover, she can also prove that her test has
been accepted because the manager signs the receipt.
Finally, Remark! ensures Mark Verifiability (p9). In fact, the marks are pub-
lished before the mixnet reveals their secret exponents. Thus, the candidate can
verify that the manager registers the correct mark once the mixnet revokes her
anonymity. Note that both the manager and the examiner sign the test to which
the mark is assigned. Since the mark is signed by the examiner, if the manager
registers an incorrect mark, the candidate can prove to an authority the correct
mark the examiner assigned to her test.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes Remark! , an e-exam protocol that achieves heterogeneous
security properties (authentication, privacy, anonymity, and verifiability) in a
realistic threat model with few security assumptions. Notably, it requires no
trusted parties but that only one mix server behave honestly. Remark! can re-
sist against collusion of candidates, examiner and manager, or examiner and
candidate. Although the paper presents an informal analysis of the protocol, a
preliminary formal analysis of Remark! in the symbolic model confirms that it
ensures all the nine fundamental security requirements. Future work is to iden-
tify more interesting security properties for remote exam, and verify whether
Remark! can ensure them. We also plan to build a prototype.
References
1. ProctorU. http://www.proctoru.com/.
2. Huszti A. and Petho˜ A. A Secure Electronic Exam System. Publicationes Mathe-
maticae Debrecen, 77:299–312, 2010.
3. Bella G., Giustolisi R., and Lenzini G. What Security for Electronic Exams? In
Proc. of 8th Int. Conf. on Risk and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS),
2013, 2013.
4. Benaloh J., Ryan P.Y.A., and Teague V. Verifiable postal voting. In Security
Protocols XXI, volume 8263 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 54–65.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
5. Castella`-Roca J., Herrera-Joancomart´ı J., and Dorca-Josa A. A Secure E-Exam
Management System. In Proc. of the Int. Conf. on Availability, Reliability and
Security (ARES), 2006, pages 864–871, 2006.
6. Haenni R. and Spycher O. Secure internet voting on limited devices with anonymized
dsa public keys. In Proceedings of the 2011 Conference on Electronic Voting Tech-
nology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, EVT/WOTE’11. USENIX Association,
2011.
A Appendix: Message Sequence Chart
Notation. A test question is denoted by quest , and a test answer by ans. SKX
and PKX denotes the ElGamal private and public keys of the principal X. We
assume a common public generator g for the keys of all principals. PKX denotes
the pseudonym of the principal X, and rXi is the secret value used by the mix
server i when processing the batch of the role X. The terms Enc and Sig denote
respectively the encryption and signature functions of a message. In particular,
the notation Sig{msg}SKX ,hX denotes the message msg and its signature using
the private key SKX and the parameter hX rather than g.
Examiner CandidateMixnet N(1), . . . , N(m) Manager
Regist.
r¯m =
m∏
i=1
ri, PKC = PK
rm
C , hC = g
r¯m
r¯′m =
m∏
i=1
r′i, PKE = PK
r¯′m
E , hE = g
r¯′m
-Sig{PKC , hC}SKN(m) B.B.
-Sig{PKE , hE}SKN(m) B.B.
Check PKC = h
SKC
CCheck PKE = h
SKE
E
Test.
ﬀ Enc{Sig{quest ,PKC}SKM }PKCB.B.
ﬀ
TC = 〈quest , ans,PKC〉
Enc{Sig{TC}SKC ,hC}PKM
ﬀ Enc{Sig{TC}SKM }PKCB.B.
Mark.
B.B.ﬀ Enc{Sig{TC}SKM }PKE
-
MC = 〈Sig{TC}SKM ,mark〉
Enc{Sig{MC}SKE ,hE}PKM
Notif.
ﬀ Enc{Sig{MC}SKE ,hE}PKCB.B.
-r¯C
SSL
Register PKC ,mark
